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Abstract— In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against 
state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This 
class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show 
that with the knowledge of the system configuration an 
attacker could successfully inject false data into certain state 
variable while bypassing existing techniques for bad data 
detection. In the preliminary section we consider the 
feasibility of such an attack and the necessary condition to 
successfully avoid detection. After that we show that with the 
knowledge of the system configuration, certain line flow 
measurements could be manipulated to lead to profitable 
misconduct. By controlling Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) view of system power flow and 
congestions, an attacker could manipulate the LMPs of 
targeted buses according to prior biddings.  
Also, in this paper we show the implementation of the false 
data injection attacks. The numerical example considered was 
applied to a malicious data detection algorithm that was 
designed on a microcontroller. The results demonstrated the 
effectiveness of injecting false data measurements into the 
state estimation of electric power grids.   
Keywords-; Power system state estimation, false data 
injection attacks, bad data detection, cyber attack, power system 
security  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The power grid is undergoing substantial changes as the 
idea of a smart grid is getting more popular. The 
implementation of the smart grid must be accompanied by 
numerous changes in the way the power grid is observed 
and analyzed. This is being made available by the 
technological advances in sensing, communication and 
actuation. While the majority of researchers have been 
involved in improving the power system operational 
efficiency and reliability, cyber attacks remain to be a vital 
threat to the power grid. Therefore, the potential risks of a 
cyber attack should be further studied before the 
implementation of a smart grid.  
Power system researchers have realized the threat of bad 
data measurements and developed certain techniques for 
processing them e.g., [1]-[3]. The techniques developed 
involve two steps, first detect if there are bad measurements 
and then identify and remove them. This technique as well 
as other techniques is aimed at filtering arbitrary bad 
measurements. If any smart attack is considered as random 
bad data, then the developed methods should be able to 
successfully filter the false measurements.  
However, this paper shows that the developed bad data 
detection techniques could be bypassed if a certain smart 
attack is injected into the system. Nevertheless, the 
construction of certain attacks requires knowledge of the 
power grid configuration. The reason that that this attack 
could be made is the assumption that: “when bad 
measurements are present, the squares of differences 
between the observed measurements and their 
corresponding estimates become significant [1].” Therefore, 
the attacker can bypass bad measurement detection by 
violating this assumption. This can be carried out with the 
proper knowledge of the power grid configuration. 
The operation of the power grid became significantly 
different after the industry deregulation. The operation of 
the physical power systems are organized into Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs). As a result, a potential 
cyber attack on the state estimation of these RTOs has 
recently become a major concern. The Energy Management 
System (EMS) is responsible to relay a robust estimation of 
the entire system. Therefore, this management system will 
be a major target for attacker aiming to manipulate the 
system. In [4] the scheme of false data injection attacks 
against a power grid’s state estimation was first introduced. 
The paper showed that by acquiring certain information 
about the network topology the bad data detection 
techniques employed by SCADA systems could be 
bypassed. In [5] two possible indices are proposed in order 
to quantify required efforts to implement such a class of 
attack. In [6] there were attempts to develop 
computationally efficient heuristics to detect such false data 
attacks against state estimators. In [7] the method of 
employing such attacks to lead to profitable financial 
misconduct was presented. Such profit could be acquired by 
virtual bidding the ex-post LMP while simultaneously 
injecting false data into the state estimation.  
In this paper we present false data injection attacks from 
the attacker’s perspective. We first show that the bypassing 
of bad data detection could be achieved. We then apply the 
presented injection attacks onto a 5-bus system. Three 
scenarios are studied on the same system. In the first 
scenario actual measurements are taken directly to the 
system without bad data injection. Also, two methods were 
used to detect bad data: Normalized Residuals and Chi-
Square methods. In the second scenario, bad data is injected 
into the system using the attack scheme presented. The 
attack scheme aims at injecting undetectable random data 
into the system. It is then shown that both methods of 
detection fail to identify the presence of the injected bad 
measurements. In the third scenario random bad data is 
added to the system to demonstrate the effectiveness of bad 
data detection techniques of malicious bad data.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
gives background and shows some related work. Section 3 
presents the basic principle of false data injection attacks. 
Section 4 demonstrates the success of these attacks by 
simulation. Section 5 concludes this paper points out future 
research directions. 
II.  PRELIMIARIES 
A. Power System (Power Grid)) 
The power transmission system consists of electric 
generators, transmission lines, and transformers that form a 
power grid. It connects a variety of electric generator 
together with a host of users across a large geographical 
area. Redundant paths and line are provided so that power 
can be routed from an y power plant to any customer, 
through a variety of routes, based on the economics of 
transmission paths and cost of power. A control center is 
usually used to monitor and control the power system and 
devices in a geographical area. 
B. State Estimation Backgroud 
It is essential to monitor and control the power flows and 
voltages in a power system in order to maintain system 
reliability and stability. Power meters scattered around the 
power grid provide control centers with the necessary 
measurements to monitor the system. These measurements 
are used in the state estimation algorithm of the EMS to 
estimate the state of the system variables. State variables 
include bus voltages and magnitudes.  
The DC power flow model of a state estimation problem 
is most commonly used. This is a linearization of the AC 
power flow problem. The goal is to estimate the power 
system variables 
nRx  based on measurements mRz . 
Therefore, x and z are related according to  
                                eHxz                                   (1) 
where 
nmjihH  )( , . The statistical estimation criteria most 
commonly used in the weighted least-square criterion. When 
meter error is assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean, this criteria leads to an identical estimator with the 
following matrix solution 
                     zRHHRHx TT 111 )( 
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where R is the inverse of W; a diagonal matrix whose 
elements are reciprocals of the variances of meter error.  
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where 2
i  is the variance of the i-th meter )1( mi   . 
C. Bad Data Measurment Detection 
Bad measurements could be present due to 
several reasons such as meter failure, 
miscommunication and malicious attacks. There 
are certain techniques that have been developed 
to detect these bad data and remove them to 
protect the robustness of the state estimator [8]. 
In a regular measurement, a meter provides an 
estimate of the state variable close to the actual 
value, while abnormal measurements are skewed 
from their true values. Researchers have proposed 
to calculate the measurement residual xHzr ˆ  
(i.e. the difference between observed 
measurements and estimated measurements) and 
then use its L2-norm ||ˆ|| xHz   to detect the 
presence of bad data. Essentially, ||ˆ|| xHz  is 
compared to a threshold , if  ||ˆ|| xHz , then 
there is bad data.  
 The Normalized Residual method takes into 
account the maximum normalized residual and 
compares that with a threshold determined by a 
unit Gaussian function to determine the presence 
of bad data. Also it can be shown mathematically 
that 2||ˆ|| xHz  follows a )(2 v -distribution (chi-
square), where v = m - n is the degree of freedom. 
This method is called the Chi-Square method of 
detecting bad data thus the threshold   is 
determined using a Chi-Square function.  
A level of certainty is associated with each 
choice of . This level of certainty is chosen by 
the system operator to represent the level of trust 
we associate to our bad data detector. In this 
paper a certainty level of 99% was chosen. 
 
III.  FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACK MODEL 
In this section we will show how smart false data 
injection could be carried out to bypass the bad data 
detection methods introduced earlier. Let us consider a 
system with n state variables x1,…,xn and m meters with 
measurements z1,…,zm. The H matrix described in Section 2 
is then an m x n matrix that describes the relationship 
between the measurements and the state variables. This H 
matrix is a constant matrix determined by the placement of 
the meters and the line impedances. In [8] it is described 
how control centers construct H. In our application we 
assume that the attacker has access to this H matrix as well 
as access to the meters to be compromised.  
In the first part we discuss the smart random false data 
injection, meaning the attacker aims at injecting false data 
into random meters. Also, targeted false data is presented in 
which the attacker aims at altering a specific measurement 
for certain benefit.  
In the following sub-sections we explain the 
mathematical principal of false data injection and how it is 
able to bypass detection. Then we apply the attack of each 
scenario.    
A. Basic Mathematical Principle 
As defined earlier T
mzzz ),...,( 1  is the original vector 
of measurements without any alteration. Then we define a 
vector za that represents the vector of observed 
measurements that contains malicious data. Therefore, za 
can be represented as azza  , where 
T
maaa ),...,( 1 is 
the attack vector that contains the malicious data added to 
the original measurements.  
Also, let 
badxˆ  and xˆ  represent the estimates of x using 
malicious data za and the original measurements z, 
respectively. Then we can represent cxxbad  ˆˆ , where c is 
a non-zero vector of length n. This vector c then represents 
the error injected by the attacker.  
Therefore, the attackers objective would be to inject an 
attack vector using Hc (i.e. a=Hc). Since bad data detection 
methods compute the L2-norm of the measurement residual 
to check for the existence of bad data. The L2-norm of the 
malicious data is the same as that of the original 
measurements if an attack vector is chosen in that way. In 
other words, choosing an attack vector that is a linear 
combination of the columns of H would bypass the 
detection technique that utilizes the norm of the residuals. 
Theorem 1 below shows the proof of the above claim.  
 
THEOREM 1. If the original measurements z can bypass 
bad data detection then the malicious measurements 
azza   can pass the detection test if a is a linear 
combination of the column vectors of H [4].   
PROOF. Since z can pass the detection, we have 
 ||ˆ|| xHz , where   is the detection threshold 
assigned. Also, if we have a = Hc then the norm of the 
measurement residual is,  
 
 ||)ˆ(||||ˆ|| cxHazxHz bada   
    ||)(ˆ|| HcaxHz   
     ||ˆ|| xHz                               (5) 
 
Thus, the norm of the measurement residual of za is also 
less than the threshold . This implies that za can also 
bypass the bad data detection process. The attacker can 
choose a random vector c to inject random false data into 
the system; alternatively a carefully calculated vector c 
could change specific measurements to a desired value.  
B. Random False Data Injection 
We assume the attacker has access to k meters in the 
power grid. Also assume   km iiI ,...,1  is the set of 
indices of those meters. Then the attacker needs to create an 
attack vector  Tmaaa ,...,1  such that 0ia for 
mIi and a is a linear combination of the column vectors 
of H. There are several methods to calculate the attack 
vector a. [8] presents a method that rewrites the relation a = 
Hc as Ba=0. Where, IPB  and P is defined as 
TT HHHHP )( . In [4] it is also shown that if 
1 nmk then there exists an attack vector a in which 
0ia  for mIi . 
Construction of Attack Vectors: When the condition 
1 nmk  is satisfied the attacker can directly perform 
column transformations on H, such that the resulting matrix 
is a linear combination of the columns. However, the 
elements that are not controlled by the attacker have to be 
eliminated. Then each such constructed vector could be used 
as an attack vector. 
 
  
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In this section, we confirm that false data injection 
attacks could be injected into state estimators and remain 
undetected by bad data detection techniques. Also, we show 
that false data could be injected to target certain 
measurements to affect the Locational Marginal Price 
(LMP) at certain nodes. A 5-bus system with 6 branch 
measurements was used as our test system (figure 1). In the 
first part of the simulation the goal is to show the feasibility 
of creating an attack vector that could bypass bad data 
detection.  
In our test case, a DC power flow model was assumed; 
all nodes have a voltage level of 1p.u. Also, the 
measurements are real power branch flow measurements. 
The H matrix was derived according to the assumed line 
impedances. State estimation and bad data detection were 
simulated using MATALB R2008a, on the other hand LMP 
simulations were carried out in PowerWorld.   
Bus 1 Bus 2
Bus 3 Bus 4
Bus 5
Generator
Load
1
4
4
32
5
Gen 2
Gen 1
Gen 3
 
Figure 1: 5-Bus test system 
Table I. Line impedance and Original Measurements 
 
A. False Data Injection Results 
The case system used is shown in figure 1 and 
the line impedances are given in Table I. Three 
cases are applied to the 5 bus system. Case 1 is 
where original measurements are applied to the 
system without any interference. In this case a 
normal optimal power flow is solved with LMP 
considerations. Therefore, when bad data 
detection is applied the estimator shows that the 
estimated measurements are clean of malicious 
Measurement 
(m) 
Branch 
Line Impedance 
(p.u.) 
Measurements 
Values (p.u.) 
1 1-2 0.03 0.91 
2 1-3 0.05 -0.16 
3 2-4 0.05 0.19 
4 2-5 0.08 0.21 
5 3-4 0.05 0.89 
6 4-5 0.08 0.09 
data. In case 2, a random vector is applied to the 
original measurement vector. The state estimator 
functions properly in estimation; as well as, the 
bad data detection which reveals the false data 
and reveals which branch measurement should be 
dropped from the estimator. Two bad data 
detection techniques were used: Normalized 
residuals and Chi-Square method (discussed 
earlier). In case 3, smart false data is injected into 
the measurement vector. This attack vector is 
randomly chosen with the only condition is to 
satisfy a = Hc. The attack vector successfully 
alters the estimated measurements and more 
importantly bypasses both bad data detection 
techniques applied.  
B. False Injection for Profit 
In the second part of the example, the ability of the 
attacker to manipulate the market price based on false data 
injection was tested. The 5-bus system was modeled in 
PowerWorld with the appropriate line properties to maintain 
a constant H matrix. The loads were also designed to ensure 
the real power line flows most accurately resembled the 
original measurements taken. The generator properties and 
load magnitudes are given in Tables II &III. In the initial 
run of market clearing prices with OPF constraints the 
results were that Gen 1. would generate at maximum 
capacity while Gen 2. would pick up the remaining load and 
Gen 3. was kept on reserve.   
The false data injection was simulated in Matlab to 
obtain the new (false) measurement estimates. The c vector 
was calculated to simulate congestion on line 3-4. This 
would then limit the power production by the generator on 
bus 3. Then to model this change in measurements the load 
was manipulated in PowerWorld to resemble the change. 
After that, the market clearing prices were calculated and 
the result was that Gen 3. was forced to operate, thus 
increasing the LMP at buses 2,4 and 5. The change in LMP 
is shown in Table IV. Then the attacker would buy power at 
bus 1 before injection and sell power at bus 4 after false data 
injection for maximum profit. This manipulation of the 
market clearing prices would remain to be undetectable 
because of the inability of the bad data detection to sense the 
erroneous measurements.  
Table II. Generator Properties and Load Magnitudes 
Gen 
number 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Maximum 
Capacity 
(MW) 
1 10 250 
2 15 300 
3 30 500 
 
Table III. Load Magnitudes 
Load on Bus 
number 
Load Magnitude 
(MW) 
1 100 
2 100 
3 200 
4 40 
5 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV. LMP Before and After False Data Injection 
Bus 
number 
LMP Before 
False Injection 
($/MWh) 
LMP After 
False Injection 
($/MWh) 
1 15 22.57 
2 15 27.12 
3 15 15 
4 15 32.88 
5 15 30 
 
V.  HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION  
        In this section, the hardware implementation 
of our system design is presented and discussed. 
The realization of such a system was designed on 
Proteus. The main component that was used in 
our design was a PIC microcontroller. The source 
code is written on a PC host using a C compiler, 
assembled and downloaded to the chip as shown 
in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Programming Operations of the PIC 
 
      A serial link is the connection unit that serves 
as a delivery communication between the host PC 
and the programming unit. The PC runs a C-
compiler, so that once a program has been written 
and assembled, it is downloaded by placing the 
chip in a PICSTART Plus connected to a PC [9].  
Fig. 3 shows the proposed design for the PIC 
microcontroller that has been used in this project. 
      The objective of the PIC in this project is to 
identify the presence of the injected bad 
measurements based on the simulation has been 
done by the Matlab 
 
 
 
Fig. 3   Proteus Simulation of the Circuit Design 
 
       In our design, a 20 MHz crystal circuit is 
used to give a 200ns instruction execution time 
and to create a precise frequency when subject to 
electrical stimulation, which is more convenient 
for analyzing program timing [10]. Moreover, the 
crystal oscillator needs to be physically near the 
MCU to prevent the crystal from oscillating, or 
affecting the resonant frequency. In addition, a 
10pF capacitor is used to avoid the clock signal 
causing a malfunction, and two 15Pf are used to 
stabilize the frequency. 
        As shown in Fig. 3, the Proteus simulation 
software was used to write in C-compiler in order 
to provide virtual instruments which was used to 
build up the circuit, just as in a real application 
 
VI. CONCLUSION   
In this paper we present a potential cyber attack 
on the state estimation system used in Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs). The 
SCADA system uses DC power flow model to 
estimate the state of the system using real 
measurements. We show how an attacker could 
inject false data into the state estimation system 
while bypassing bad data detection techniques. 
Also, we show how an attacker could target 
specific branches to change the LMP on certain 
nodes for financial gains.  
Some future directions of this work would be 
to design a more robust state estimator that could 
detect such false data injection attacks. Some 
efforts have been done to design indices to show 
how we can limit such attacks [8]. Also, a 
counter-attack method that employs a linear 
combination of H could also be designed to stop 
the effect of such attacks. Redundancy methods 
would also offer a solution to such a problem of 
malicious injected data.    
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